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Franz Gabriel Nauen, Revolution, Idealism, and Human Freedom: 
Schelling, Hölderlin, and Hegel and the Crisis of Early German 
Idealism. (Nijhoff, the Hague, 1971). 
 
The 1790's were a time of upheaval, and every thinker in 
Europe was moved by the events of France, by the measure of fear or 
of promise they offered. In Germany the reaction to the political 
tumult was intense; the seeds of French radicalism found a ground 
nurtured by idealistic moral ideology, on the one hand, and actual 
political backwardness on the other. The cultural result of the 
completed Kantian philosophy was—as Schiller's Letters on Aesthetic 
Education testify—a preoccupation with the notion of freedom and its 
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paradoxical invisibility. If one could not touch upon freedom to violate 
it, neither could one grasp it in order to nurture, establish or 
institutionalize it. This proved a quandary not for theoretical or 
philosophic reason alone. History had taken up the Kantian 
problematic, and as the progress of the Revolution through ‘the Terror' 
indicated, made its solution most urgent. 
 
Such was the tenor of the world for, or the pressure of the 
Zeitgeist upon, the comrades of the Tübingen Stift. What is distinctive 
about the philosophies of Schelling, Hegel and Hölderlin in their 
political germ, contends Nauen, is the attempt they make to 
regionalize their political solutions, to adapt the cosmic sweep and 
violent tempo of the French upheaval to the more pastoral Schwabian 
situation, and to the considerable (and in many ways surprising) 
liberal tradition long established in Württemberg politics. 
 
Certainly every attentive reader of Hegel or Schelling or 
Hölderlin desires to look back into those Tübingen years, to discern the 
reactions of these remarkable comrades to the French events, and to 
trace out the lines of influence from their youthful political enthusiasm 
to their mature views. Even more he would like to be able to delineate 
the influences of these three disparate spirits upon one other. All these 
things Nauen attempts to do, but the brevity of his study, its 
chronological limitations—it follows Schelling only to 1796, Hegel and 
Hölderlin only to 1800—and its dryness frustrate the emergence of a 
sharp picture of "The Tübingen 3." 
 
The basis for Nauen's study, and the one area where he makes 
a solid contribution, is the politics of the Duchy of Württemberg. A 
semi-republican spirit had long existed there, where both the power 
and enlightenment ideology of the Catholic Duke had been 
counterbalanced by the Estates, a body representative of the middle 
class and dominated by the Pietist clergy. By 1790 the Enlightenment, 
championed by the court and the new ducal academy, the Karlsschule, 
had made deep inroads upon the Church. When the Duke and the 
Estates again came into conflict, orthodox theology was no longer a 
moving force and the traditionally liberal and socially-minded classes 
represented by the Estates found themselves without ideology and 
without spokesmen. Hölderlin, Hegel, and Schelling were acutely 
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aware of this vacuum; the project of the Tübingen years, common to 
all three of them, was the fabrication of a new ideology—the new 
"mythology of freedom" of Schelling's 1796 Systemprogramme. 
 
Nauen depicts with some success the radicalizing atmosphere of 
the Tübingen seminary. Traditionally the channel npt only to a clerical 
career, but to positions in the state bureaucracy and to eventual 
political power in the Estates, the seminary was quite alive to the 
significance of the events in France. And within the very seminary 
walls themselves there was the conflict, in the minds of faculty and 
students alike, between orthodox Pietist theology and Enlightenment 
rationalism. It was an environment which made it not only possible, 
but rather likely, that a young Hegel, rebelling against the tacit 
compromises of his professors with both ‘old theology' and ‘old 
polities', would pen such documents critical of Christianity as we have 
extant in the Early Writings. 
 
Nauen does not meet comparable success in tracing out the 
specific development of Hölderlin, Schelling and Hegel and making 
intelligible the connecting links (if any) between the days of active 
radicalism, that is, active support of Girondist or Jacobin politics 
abroad and of pro-French parties at home, to their philosophical 
systems. He is most concrete and convincing in his sketch of the 
moral-political dynamic inside Schilling's early writings. His treatment 
of Hölderlin indicates the poet's social and political concerns, but 
utterly fails to communicate the depth and intensity of his concern; 
one can see very little of Heidegger's poet and primal-speaker in this 
grey and prosey ideologue Nauen presents. And his treatment of 
Hegel, an attempt to read between the lines and establish a thread of 
thematic continuity among the Early Writings, only seems to establish 
that the struggle to give a political meaning to abstract, interior 
Kantian freedom was not the impulse that turns Hegel to systematic 
philosophy in 1800. Here, as in his treatment of Schelling on 
intellectual intuition and the readability of freedom, Nauen commits 
the mistake of regarding political interest and commitment as the only 
dynamic in his philosophers' development, disregarding completely 
logical, methodological, and epistemological concerns. Freedom 
engaged the passionate interest of Schelling, Hölderlin and Hegel not 
as a prosaic moral fact, nor even just as a moral-political possibility; it 
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draws them also because of its invisibility, its transcendence, its hints 
of absoluteness. The possibility of freedom sets not only the political 
problem, but the problem of method (or of dialectical or holistic 
knowledge), and it is the latter problem that motivates the 
philosopher's concern for the philosophical system. 
 
Mr. Nauen's monograph is on a topic of intrinsic interest to any 
scholar of Hegel or Schelling or Hölderlin. It is most disappointing, 
then, that the author hides the wealth of his research in footnotes and 
proceeds in large scale generalities. In a study whose aim is to clarify 
the relations of Hölderlin, Schelling and Hegel, it is certainly pertinent 
to quote from their letters to one another. Concreteness, vividness, 
wealth of detail, these are Hegelian virtues which a study of this 
nature ought not to lack. 
